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We analyze the questions associated with flexible outsourcing both with committed and 
flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic labour markets. How does profit sharing 
influence flexible outsourcing? What is the relationship between outsourcing cost, profit 
sharing and equilibrium unemployment, when profit sharing is also a part of the compensation 
schemes in other industries? In the case of committed profit sharing, outsourcing cost 
increases wage. Optimal flexible profit sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing, 
but outsourcing cost and wage will have ambiguous effect on optimal flexible profit sharing. 
Implementing profit sharing can help to avoid outsourcing due to a direct productivity effect 
and a wage effect. For equilibrium unemployment the effects of outsourcing cost and profit 
sharing are ambiguous both in case of committed and flexible profit sharing. In the case of 
zero effort elasticity there is no committed or flexible profit sharing in the absence or presence 
of outsourcing and in this case lower outsourcing cost will decrease unemployment. 
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1.     Introduction  
 
Wage differences constitute a central explanation for the increasing business practice 
of international outsourcing across industries (see e.g. Sinn (2007) or Stefanova 
(2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing). It is important to 
mention that Amiti and Wei (2005) and Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big 
difference in labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in 
outsourcing of both manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs. Of 
course one reason for these wage gaps is the difference of labour market institutions. 
In most western European countries the wage is still determined by bargaining 
between firms and trade unions, but e.g. in eastern European or Asian countries there 
is either no wage bargaining or trade unions are much weaker.  
Concerning the analysis of the effect of outsourcing on compensation   
schemes under wage bargaining there are two focuses in the literature, the case of 
committed outsourcing and flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case, 
outsourcing takes place before wage bargaining
1, but in the flexible case outsourcing 
is decided after wage bargaining. Our focus in this paper is to assume that outsourcing 
is flexible, i.e. determined simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but after 
wage formation. Skaksen (2004) has analyzed flexible outsourcing using a Cobb-
Douglas production function by assuming that output good is produced by combining 
two intermediate activities, where one activity can be perfect substitute by 
outsourcing.  Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-stage 
game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the labour union sets 
wages before firms decide on the degree of outsourcing. But in these papers they have 
abstracted from the analysis of profit sharing as a part of the compensation scheme, 
which is our focus.
2     
Since in the case of flexible outsourcing wage bargaining has taken before 
outsourcing decision, the opportunity of external procurement can be use as a threat in 
                                                 
1   See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage 
bargaining. Also e.g. Danthine and Hunt (1994), Zhao (2001) and Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) 
have analyzed committed outsourcing issue.  
2   There are also some new analysis, which incorporated flexible outsourcing and wage bargaining, 
e.g. Koskela and Poutvaara (2008) or Koskela (2008). But the mainly focus in these papers are 
labour taxation issues in the absence of profit sharing.   3
the bargaining round and lowers the wage. If domestic labour and outsourcing are 
perfect substitutes, domestic wages have to be lower than outsourcing cost, so the 
price for external procurement is an upper bound. To keep domestic production 
attractive, it needs lower marginal costs or wages. But if lower costs are not possible, 
then firms have to increase productivity of domestic production, which is influenced 
by workers’ effort. One way to stimulate effort is profit sharing, which may reduce 
wages because part of the former base wage can be substituted by profit income. 
Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an important phenomenon in many 
OECD countries. Pendleton et al (2001) have presented delailed data on profit sharing 
schemes in 14 OECD countries.
3 As profit sharing is now commonly incorporated in 
the compensation schemes and international outsourcing has recently increased e.g. in 
western EU-countries and in the United States, it is important to study the 
implications of both flexible outsourcing and profit sharing for wage bargaining and 
equilibrium unemployment.
4  
We extend the literature of flexible outsourcing by implementing profit 
sharing as a part of the compensation scheme. In our analysis we distinguish two 
different time sequences of profit sharing, i.e. by assuming that profit sharing might 
be committed or flexible in terms of wage formation. The idea behind the 
implementation of profit sharing is that this will induce incentives to increase effort 
and so productivity for given wage level. Profit sharing will also affect the wage 
formation, what could lead to a lower base wage since a part of the former wage level 
is substituted by profit income. Since only the base wage enters marginal cost, in this 
case outsourcing will decrease.  
In this paper we analyze the following questions associated with flexible 
outsourcing both with committed and flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic 
labour markets. First, how does outsourcing cost influence both wage formation and 
profit sharing? Second, how does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? Third, 
what is the relationship between flexible outsourcing, profit sharing and equilibrium 
                                                 
3         See also Conyon and Freeman (2001). 
4   In the presence of committed outsourcing, which is decided before wage formation, Koskela and 
König (2008) have analyzed the relationship between profit sharing, exogenous outsourcing and 
equilibrium unemployment.        4
unemployment, when profit sharing is also a part of the compensation schemes in 
other industries?  
We find that in both profit sharing scenarios lower outsourcing cost lowers the 
wage. In the presence of flexile outsourcing, profit sharing is a supplementary or 
compensating part of income. If there is no outsourcing, profit sharing has also an 
ambiguous character. In the presence of flexible outsourcing optimal flexible profit 
sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing. Moreover, lower outsourcing 
cost and higher wage will have ambiguous effect on optimal flexible profit sharing 
and also on optimal committed profit sharing, but in the absence of outsourcing higher 
wage rate will have no effect on flexible profit sharing.  
In the case of zero effort elasticity there is of course no committed or flexible 
profit sharing in the absence or presence of outsourcing. In this scenario the wages are 
the same both in the committed and flexible case, but lower in presence outsourcing. 
Under positive effort elasticity without outsourcing higher profit sharing in the 
committed case will lead to a smaller wage compared to the flexible case under a 
complementary character of profit sharing and vice versa under a supplementary 
character of profit sharing.  
In terms of equilibrium unemployment the effects of outsourcing cost and 
profit sharing are ambiguous both in the committed and flexible profit sharing. In the 
absence of outsourcing profit sharing will also have an ambiguous unemployment 
effect.  But if effort elasticity is zero, higher outsourcing cost will enhance the 
unemployment.    
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical 
framework and two different time sequences in terms of profit sharing decision. 
Labour demand, outsourcing and employee effort are presented in Section 3. Section 
4 investigates the wage formation by monopoly labour union with committed profit 
sharing and in section 5 with flexible profit sharing. Section 6 explores the 
implications of flexible outsourcing and different time decisions of profit sharing on 
equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we present conclusions in section 7.      
 
   5
2.    The Basic Framework 
We assume that output depends not only on domestic labour and international 
outsourcing, but also on the effort by workers, i.e. the workers’ productivity. This lies 
in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis (see e.g. the book edited by 
Akerlof and Yellen (1986)). We analyze two alternative timing decisions. The timing 
structure (I) captures the idea that the representative firm is flexible to decide about 
the amount of outsourcing simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but commits 
to profit sharing before wage determination. After the firm has decided about profit 
sharing, the monopoly trade union set the wage with respect to the profit share level. 
Knowing the base wage the representative firm determines outsourcing and 
employment. If the wage and profit share level is known, the representative worker 
decides on effort provision. The partly alternative timing structure (II) will change the 
timing of determination of profit sharing and wage determination so that the 
representative firm decides profit sharing after wage formation and will be flexible to 
decide on outsourcing and labour demand. Also the worker will decide about his 
effort after knowing the earnings components. We summarize these alternative timing 
decisions in Figure 1 and analyze these in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1:  Alternative time sequences of decisions in terms of outsourcing, 
employment, effort, wage formation and profit sharing  
 
(I)   Flexible outsourcing and committed profit sharing: 
 
   Stage 1    Stage 2    Stage 3              
 
profit           wage      outsourcing M , labour demand L 
   sharing τ                 formation w       and effort determination e  
 
(II)  Flexible outsourcing and flexible profit sharing: 
 
    Stage 1    Stage 2    Stage 3              
 
   wage     profit                 outsourcing M , labour demand L  
   formation w           sharing τ             and effort determination e  
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3.  Optimal Outsourcing, Labour Demand and Employee Effort 
 
In this section we characterize the optimal labour demand and outsourcing by the 
representative firm and the effort by the representative worker. The revenue function 
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where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L is the amount of domestic 
labour and M the firm’s labour input acquired from external suppliers through 
outsourcing. Here we assume that there is a perfect substitutability between domestic 
labour and outsourcing.  
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M =  .                                                                        (3b) 
 
Domestic labour demand is a negative function of wage and the amount of 
outsourcing and a positive function of both outsourcing cost and effort. Higher 
outsourcing will decrease domestic labour demand, which lies in conformity with 
empirics (see e.g. Senses (2006)). However, labour demand does not directly depend   7
on profit sharing, which lies also in conformity with empirical evidence.
5 For 
outsourcing we found that the external procurement is a positive function of wage rate 
and a negative function of both outsourcing cost and effort. The reactions could be 
described by the outsourcing elasticities in terms of outsourcing cost, effort and wage 
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w M w .  
The effort provision of the worker is associated with a disutility, which is 
assumed to satisfy the following convex function  ( )
γ γ
/ 1 e e g =  with  1 0 < <γ , i.e. 
() () 0 ' ' , ' > e g e g . The individual utility function for the employed worker is (4a) and 




w v − + = π
τ
,                                                     (4a)                 
b v = ,                                                                          (4b)  
 
where  π  captures the firm’s profit and b stands for the unemployed worker’s 
exogenous outside option. Utility maximization yields the optimal effort level. The 
first-order condition in terms of effort determination for (4a) is  
 
() 0 ' = − = e g
L
v e e π
τ
.                                                   (5)                  
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− + =  equation (5) implies  
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γ
τ  is the elasticity of effort with respect to profit sharing and wage 
rate (see about this, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006)). Therefore the optimal effort by 










e = , so that base wage 
                                                 
5         See e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997).   8
and profit sharing enhance productivity by increasing effort provision and affect 
positively labour demand indirectly.
6 But outsourcing will have no effect in the case 
of perfect substitutability between outsourcing and effective domestic labour. 
The wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important later 
on, can be expressed as   
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⎡ + + − = − ≡ 1 1 1 ,                    (7) 
 





⎛ + − =
eL
M c 1 1  is the wage elasticity of labour demand under 
committed outsourcing.
7 In both scenarios the wage elasticity depends on parameters 
δ  and γ  and also on outsourcing and wage rate via Land e.   
 
 
4.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Flexible 
Outsourcing and Committed Profit Sharing 
 
Now we analyze the timing structure (I) when the representative firm commits to 
profit sharing before the wage formation by allowing for their effects on labour 
demand and effort determination. 
 
4.1.  Wage Formation under Committed Profit Sharing  
 
By analyzing the wage formation under committed profit sharing the objective 
                                                 
6    This finding lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and 
Wilson (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Kruse (1992), and Wadhwani and Wall (1990)). Of 
course, we have to mention that these issues have not been studied to our knowledge empirically 
in the presence of outsourcing. Also in the theoretical focus of the literature we find evidence of 
increasing effort by higher wages, see e.g. Lin et al. (2002).     
7   See Koskela and König (2008).   9
function of monopoly labour union is assumed to be  ( )v L N vL V − + = , which we 
can rewrite by using equations (4a) and (4b) as 
 
                              () ( ) bN L e g L b w V + − + − = π τ ,                                     (8)  
 
where  b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labour union members N . 
Maximizing in terms of the base wage subject to labour demand, effort determination, 
and profit sharing, gives  
 
() ( ) ( ) 0 ' = − − + − + = w w w w w e e Lg L e g b w L L V π τ ,                             (9)       
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.                                            (10) 
 
This is an implicit form concerning wage formation because both the nominator and 
denominator of the mark-up depend in a non-linear way on the wage rate. To answer 
our first question, we have first to show the relationship between wage elasticity of 
labour demand and base wage, profit sharing and outsourcing cost.  
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In the absence of outsourcing we have  0
0 =
= M w η  so that base wage does not affect 
the wage elasticity of labour demand and in this case it is constant and smaller, i.e.   10
η γ δ γ η η < + − = =
= ) 1 (
0 M . In this case the result of the base wage determination by 
the monopoly labour union can be expressed as an explicit specification, i.e. 
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δ γ ητ .                             (12) 
 
Higher profit sharing will increase effort and effective labour, so that the wage 
elasticity of labour demand is more inelastic. In the absence of outsourcing, profit 
sharing does not affect the wage elasticity of labour demand, i.e.  0
0 =
= M τ η . The 
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MeL eLM c c
c δ γ η  so that we have   
 










c δ γ η .                   (13) 
  
Higher outsourcing cost will decrease the wage elasticity of labor demand and will 
reduce ceteris paribus the demand of outsourcing, which leads to a decrease of the 
ratio of outsourcing and effective labour, which makes the labour demand more 
inelastic. This lies in conformity with empirics
8.  
We can now look at the wage reaction concerning changes in profit sharing 
and outsourcing cost by taking the total differentiation of equation (10). For the effect 
                                                 
8          See e.g. Hasan et al. ((2007), Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2006)).   11
of profit sharing on the base wage by using  [ ]
η
τ γτ η 1 ) 1 ( − + −
=
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where  0 ) / 1 )( 1 ( > − − η η τ w w
9,  and in the absence of outsourcing   
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,                                      (15) 
 
so that profit sharing could have both in the presence and absence of outsourcing an 
supplementary or complementary character.
10 This results since profit sharing has 
opposed effects on the mark-up. In the presence of outsourcing, higher profit sharing 
will decrease wage elasticity so that a higher wage will have a smaller value loss of 
the trade union via less dismissal and it is beneficial for the union to set a higher 
wage. This describes the indirect effect. The direct effect of profit sharing on the base 
wage, we can see in the denominator of (10) and (10’). Here we can distinguish two 
working channels. The first part of the denominator  describes the productivity 
channel, since it depends on the effort elasticity γ . Higher profit sharing will enhance 
the productivity effect and will lead to an increasing base wage. In the second part of 
the denominator we have the substitution effect. This effect will decrease the base 
wage, which means that a former part of the base wage is substituted by profit 
income. So in our analysis we have the interplay of the positive indirect effect via 
wage elasticity and the ambiguous direct effect via a positive productivity effect and a 
negative substitution effect. In the case of no outsourcing we know that the wage 
                                                 
9         This is available upon request. 
10   There is also some empirical evidence for both properties. Black and Lynch (2000) show by 
using U.S. data, that profit sharing results in lower regular pay for workers, what implies a 
compensatory character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by using UK data and also in Kraft 
and Ugarkovic (2005) by using German panel data it has been shown that introducing profit 
sharing do not reduce the wage, what implies a supplementary character.   12
elasticity is constant, so that in this case implementing profit sharing will induce only    
the ambiguous direct effect.  
For the special case of zero effort elasticity,  0 = γ , in the presence of 
outsourcing in our model we observe for the direct working channel only the 
substitution effect, since a single worker has no effect on the firm profit he/she will 
provide in any case a constant effort level of one. Also in this scenario we have an 
ambiguous effect of implementing profit sharing, since the substitution effect will 
lower the wage, while the indirect effect will increase the wage. But for the special 
case of zero effort elasticity in the absence of outsourcing there is negative effect of 












In the case of outsourcing cost we get   
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c ,                               (16) 
 
so that lower outsourcing cost in the presence of flexible outsourcing will lower the 
wage. This holds, since lower outsourcing cost means for given wage level higher 
outsourcing demand, so that the labour demand elasticity becomes more elastic and 
therefore the wage has to fall, since the trade union can avoid higher outsourcing with 
lower in-house cost and make integrated production more attractive.
11  
We can summarize our findings to 
     
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing profit sharing is a 
supplementary or compensating part of income and lower outsourcing 
cost will lower the wage. If there is no outsourcing, profit sharing has 
also an ambiguous character on the base wage. In the special case of 
zero effort elasticity and no outsourcing there is a negative effect of 
profit sharing on the base wage.   
 
                                                 
11   This lies in conformity with empirics according to which there is substitutability between 
outsourcing and domestic labour (see e.g. Munch and Skaksen (2005)).   13
Now we analyze the effect of implementing profit sharing in a firm which engages in 
outsourcing. We can rewrite the working channel of committed profit sharing on the 
amount of outsourcing as 
















=  with 
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so that the effect of implementing profit sharing is ambiguous. For the case of a 
complementary character we know that  0 <
τ d
dw
. In this scenario implementing profit 
sharing will reduce the demand for outsourcing. This relationship is intuitively for the 
following reason. Higher profit sharing will increase effort, since workers participate 
on the firms profit and have an incentive to increase the profit by higher effort. When 
higher effort leads to an increasing labour demand some outsourcing activities will be 
avoided. But higher profit sharing will also affect the base wage. If profit sharing has 
a complementary character, higher profit sharing leads to a lower base wage. Since 
only the base wage enters the marginal cost, the advantage of integrated production 
increases by inducing a higher labour demand. In this case the amount of outsourcing 
will be lower with higher profit sharing. There are two working channels. The first is 
the wage reduction effect by substituting wage income by profit income and the 
second is the stimulating productivity effect by higher effort. Both channels are 
working in the same directions and lead to lower outsourcing demand so that we have 
 
Proposition 2:  If profit sharing has a compensatory character, 
implementing committed profit sharing will stimulating productivity and 
decrease the marginal cost, so that in this case outsourcing activities are 
decreasing. 
   14
4.2.  Committed Profit Sharing  
 
Concerning the timing structure (I) the representative firm commits to profit sharing  
to  maximize profit subject to labour demand (3a), outsourcing (3b), effort 
determination (6) and wage formation (10) so that  
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τ . Using these terms the first-
order condition  () 0 1 = − + − τ π τ π  yields the optimal committed profit sharing in the 
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0 .                                   (20) 
 
To compare these profit share levels, we have to take a look on the wage elasticity 
with respect to profit sharing in the case with and without outsourcing. Concerning 
the relationship between (19) and (20) we try to answer the inequality of committed 
profit sharing in the presence and absence of outsourcing, i.e. 
0 = >
M
c c τ τ . From this 
starting point we get the following simplified expression for the inequality (B2): 






















1 δ τ τ δ
γ
τ τ  (for details see Appendix B). Since the 
sign of the wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing is the decisive factor but we 
cannot identify the influence of profit sharing on wage (see (14) and (15)), we have to 
make some assumptions about the wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing. In 
terms of this issue we can distinguish the following four cases: 
 
Case I:  0 >
w
wτ τ and  0 <
w
wτ τ . 
In this case the RHS of (B2) is positive and the LHS is negative. Since the 
given relation in our starting point, 
0 = >
M
c c τ τ ,  we see that this is not fulfilled so that 
in this case we have a smaller profit share if a firm engages in outsourcing activities.  
Case II:  0 <
w
wτ τ and  0 <
w
wτ τ . 
In this case the RHS of (B2) is positive but the sign of the LHS is a priori 
ambiguous. Therefore, we cannot conclude in this case if profit sharing  in the 
presence of outsourcing is bigger or smaller than in the case without outsourcing.   
Case III:  0 >
w
wτ τ and  0 >
w
wτ τ .   16
In this case both sides of (B2) are negative but we cannot conclude if profit 
sharing in the presence of outsourcing is bigger or smaller than in the case without 
outsourcing.  
Case IV:  0 <
w
wτ τ and  0 >
w
wτ τ . 
In this case the RHS of (B2) is negative, but the sign of the LHS is a priori 
ambiguous. Therefore we cannot conclude if profit sharing in the presence of 
outsourcing is bigger or smaller than in the case without outsourcing. 
We can summarize our findings to 
     
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing, optimal 
committed profit sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing if 
in absence of outsourcing profit sharing has a complementary character 
but in the presence of outsourcing a supplementary character.   
 
For the special case of a zero effort elasticity but positive outsourcing, we can 
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η w w  and  0 1 < −δ . This means that in the presence of outsourcing and 
zero effort elasticity, 0 = γ , the firm will desist from profit sharing. This is reasonable 
since in a case of zero effort elasticity the worker will only provide the minimum 
effort level. The provision of the minimum effort level is the dominate strategy for a 
worker, because he/she has no influence on the firm’s profit. Since the decision about   17
effort provision  is unchanged also if the firm will set same incentives with 
introducing profit sharing, the firm will only distributed a part of her profit to the 
worker without effects on effort or profit. So it is beneficial for the firm to avoiding 
profit sharing. The same argumentation holds if the firm doesn’t engage in 




γ τ  from (21). 
 
 
5.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Flexible     
Outsourcing and Flexible Profit Sharing     
 
Now we analyze the timing structure (II) in terms of the wage formation by the 
monopoly labour union when the representative firm will decide for profit sharing 
after the wage level. 
 
5.1.      Flexible Profit Sharing                 
 
First we study the case when profit sharing is decided to maximize profit by taking 
the base wage as given and anticipating the outsourcing, labour demand and effort 
decisions so that  
() () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
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The first-order condition is similar as in the case of committed profit sharing, 
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comparison with committed outsourcing case the partial derivative of the profit in 
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2 1 , so that the first-order condition   18























. This can be solved for the 




















τ .                                      (23)  
 
This is also an implicit form, because both employee effort and labour demand also 
depend on profit sharing in a non-linear way.  In the absence of outsourcing the 














f .                                         (24) 
 
Therefore under flexible profit sharing in the presence of outsourcing the optimal 
flexible profit share is smaller than in the  absence of outsourcing, i.e. 










After knowing the optimal value of the profit share, we can analyze the effects 
of changes in the outsourcing cost and the base wage (see Appendix C). 
Differentiating (23) first with respect to profit sharing and outsourcing cost gives  
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Since the nominator of (25) is positive, higher outsourcing cost will increase the 
optimal flexible profit share only if  ( )



















. If it is not the 
case, higher outsourcing cost will decrease the optimal flexible profit sharing. 
Differentiating (23) with respect to profit sharing and wage gives  

























































.                         (26) 
Since the nominator is negative, higher wage will decrease the optimal flexible profit 
share only if  ( )



















. If it is not the case, higher wage 
formation will decrease the optimal flexible profit sharing. If the assumption is not 
fulfilled, then the opposite occurs and profit sharing will decrease with higher base 
wage. In the absence of outsourcing we have no effect of wage rate on flexible profit 








As in the committed case we can in flexible case show the impact of 




























, so that  
 






.                                                     (27) 
 
In opposite to implementing committed profit sharing here only the productivity 
effect will affect the outsourcing demand, since flexible profit sharing will not affect 
wage formation. As we mentioned earlier the productivity effect is intuitively. Since 
now workers participate on the firm profit, they have an incentive to increase the 
profit by higher effort. For given wage this will lead to higher labour demand so that 
some outsourcing activities will be avoided.  
We can summarize these findings to 
     
Proposition 4: 
a)    In the presence of flexible outsourcing optimal flexible profit 
sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing. Moreover, 
lower outsourcing cost and higher wage will have ambiguous effects   20
on optimal flexible profit sharing, but in the absence of outsourcing 
higher wage rate will have no effect on flexible profit sharing. 
b)  Implementing flexible profit sharing will increase worker’s 
productivity and will substituting outsourcing by increasing 
domestic labour.    
 
As in the case of committed profit sharing, we can also distinguish between the cases 
of a effort elasticity of zero,  0 = γ , and a positive elasticity with  1 0 < <γ . It is easy 
to see from (23) and (24) that in the presence or absence of outsourcing zero effort 








γ γ τ τ . The reason 
for this is, as mentioned in the committed case, that the worker will always provide 
the minimum level of effort since she/he has no influence on profit.  
We can also compare equations (19) and (23) as well as (20) and (24) to give 
a statement about what for timing structure concerning profit sharing is preferred by 
the worker. In a general comparison, what includes the case of positive and no 
outsourcing, we found that the optimal committed profit share is higher as the optimal 




, so that in this case 
f c τ τ >  and 
f c τ τ > (see Appendix D). Of course in the 
case of zero effort elasticity the firm will always desists from profit sharing. 
We can summarize these findings to 
 
Proposition 5:  
a) If in the committed case profit sharing has a complementary 
character on wages, then the committed profit share is higher as in 
the flexible case. The opposite holds if committed profit sharing has 
a supplementary character. 
b)  If committed profit sharing has no effect of wage formation, then the 
profit shares are in the committed and flexible case the same. 
c)  In the case of zero effort elasticity, there is no profit sharing as well 
as in the committed or flexible case and in the absence or presence 
of outsourcing.   21
  
5.2.     Wage Formation under Flexible Profit Sharing 
 
We now analyze the wage formation by the monopoly labour union under flexible 
outsourcing by using the objective function (8). Maximizing in terms of the base wage 
subject to labour demand, effort determination, and profit sharing determination, 
gives  
 
() ( ) ( ) 0 ' = − − + + − + = w w w w w w e e Lg L e g b w L L V τ π π τ .                (28)  
 
Additional to equation (9) under committed profit sharing there is the new term  w τ π , 
which characterizes the effect of the wage formation on profit sharing. The solution of 




























− − + −
=
π
τ τ γτ η
η
1 1
,                                 (29) 
 
which is also an implicit form for wage formation. In the case of flexible profit 
sharing, wage formation will affect profit sharing. For the new term 
f
w τ  we found 








. Therefore the wage will have an ambiguous 
effect on optimal flexible profit sharing in the presence of flexible outsourcing, but no 
effect in the absence of outsourcing, i.e.  0 =
f
w τ . In the absence of outsourcing we 
have an explicit specification of wage formation since   ( ) γ δ γ η + − = 1 , i.e.  
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0 τ τ γ η
η
,                                         (30) 
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Comparing equations (29) and (30) we know that in the absence of outsourcing the 
labour demand elasticity is smaller and the profit share is bigger than in the presence 
of outsourcing, i.e.  η η < and 
f f τ τ < . However there are opposed effects in the 
denominator, so we cannot give a statement whether the wage in the absence of 
outsourcing is bigger or smaller as in the presence of outsourcing, i.e.  w w<  or 
w w > .  
Indeed we can compare the wage in the committed and flexible case for some 
special assumptions.  
 
Case I: No outsourcing ( 0 = M ) and positive effort elasticity ( 1 0 < <γ ).  
  If there is no outsourcing, the labour demand elasticity is constant, 
() γ δ γ η + − = 1 . And also we know from equation (24) that in the flexible case the 
wage does not influence the profit share, so we can rewrite the base wages as 
()










1 1 τ τ γ η
η
 and  ()










1 1 τ τ γ η
η
. A comparison of the 
wage levels show that the wage relation depends on the profit sharing level. If the 
optimal profit sharing in the flexible case smaller than in the committed case, then the 
wage level in the flexible case is higher. As we mentioned in section 5.1 the relation 
of the profit share level depends on the wage reaction in the committed case (see also 
Appendix D). In the case of a complementary character of profit sharing in the 






, we found 
f c τ τ > . So a complementary profit income 
leads in the committed case to a higher profit share as in the flexible case, but this 
however results in lower base wage as in the flexible case, i.e. 
f c w w < .  If the 






, we know that 
f c τ τ <  which leads to 
f c w w > . The conclusion is that a higher profit share is 
financed by a smaller base wage.  
 
Case II: No or positive outsourcing ( 0 = M  or  0 > M ) and zero effort elasticity 
(0 = γ ).    23
In this case we know, that the firm will abandon from profit sharing, so we can 
rewrite the wage in the flexible and committed case as  b w w
c f









γ + + =
= 1
0 . This means that the wages are the same. They are also the same 
in the absence of outsourcing but the labour demand elasticity is smaller, 
0 0 = = = < =
γ γ η δ η
M , so that the wage in the presence of outsourcing is smaller due to 
the wage moderation effect of outsourcing. 
We can summarize these findings to   
 
We can summarize these findings to 
 
Proposition 6:  
a)  If there is no outsourcing but positive effort elasticity, profit sharing 
in the committed case will lead to a smaller wage in comparison to 
the flexible case under a complementary character of profit sharing 
and vice versa under a supplementary character of profit sharing. 
b)  If the effort elasticity is zero, the wages are in both timing structure 




6.    Flexible Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium 
Unemployment 
 
Finally we study the implications of outsourcing cost and profit sharing on 
equilibrium unemployment. Our focus is to characterize equilibrium unemployment 
as a function of institutional features of the labour market, defined by the benefit-
replacement ratio, the structure of compensation system and the outsourcing cost.  
The wage formation by the monopoly labour union has the form  
   24
b A w i i = ,                                                               (31) 
 






 in the case of  
 









τ τ γτ η
η
− − + −
=
1 1
 in the 
case of flexible profit sharing (equation (29)). We focus on the case with identical 
industries in terms of the wage mark-up, i.e.  A Ai = . In a general equilibrium the 
outside option b  has to be specified as expected value of being not employed in one 
of the industries so that  
                   () () uB e g
L





⎛ − + − =
π
τ 1 ,                               (32) 
 
where  u  is the equilibrium unemployment rate and B  the unemployment benefit. 
According to (32) we assume that all identical industries adopt profit sharing as a part 
of the workers’ compensation scheme so that an employed worker in one industry 
faces the probability  ) 1 ( u −  of being employed in another industry, which makes use 
of a similar compensation scheme (for this kind of a standard justification, see e.g. 
Nickell and Layard (1999), pp. 3048-3050 and Layard et al. (2005), p. 100-101). The 
probability of being unemployed is characterized by u . In this case the individual 
receives the unemployment benefit B . Moreover, we assume a constant benefit-
replacement ratio  w B q / =  in the presence of unemployment, so that  1 0 < < q . It is 
important to mention that in (31) and (32) both outsourcing cost and profit sharing 
affect the mark-up and the value of the outside option.     
Combining (31) and (32) under assumption  w B q / =  we can rewrite (31) as 
() () () Auqw e g
L





⎛ − − + − =
π
τ 1 1  so that the unemployment rate can be 
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using  ()





































 so that the unemployment rate can now be 
expressed as follows 

















































.                             (33a)  
 
where 
c τ has been expressed in (19). In the absence of outsourcing we have 
 
















































c τ has been expressed in (20). 
Now we look at the implications on equilibrium unemployment when profit 
sharing is committed in terms of wage formation. Differentiating (33a) with respect to 
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. For     26
analyzing the impacts of outsourcing cost on equilibrium unemployment we have to 
distinguish two working channels, first the mark-up effect, and second the outside 
option effect. Since both are opposed or ambiguous the influence of outsourcing cost 
is a priori ambiguous. From our former analysis we know that higher outsourcing cost 
will increase the base wage due to a smaller wage elasticity of labour demand, but 
there is also an effect on the profit share, which we cannot identify. But the wage is 
increasing, since the advantage of outsourcing is decreasing with higher outsourcing 
cost. On the other hand higher outsourcing cost will reduce outsourcing demand and 
increase domestic labour demand, which implies a better employment chance and a 
better bargaining position due to an increasing value of the outside option. Now the 
trade union can be more aggressive, since the fear of dismissal employee are weaker, 
and set a higher wage. So we find that the outside option effect is harmful for the aim 
of low unemployment rates. Also the mark-up effect tends to be harmful for 
employment due to higher labour cost, but here the effect of the profit income can 
reverse this negative employment effect, but in sum the mark-up effect is ambiguous. 
Therefore the effect of outsourcing cost on equilibrium unemployment is ambiguous.    
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τ . The impact 
of profit sharing on equilibrium unemployment is also a priori ambiguous for the 
following reasons. Higher profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect on the mark-
up due to the direct effect via the opposed productivity and substitution channel and 
due to the wage increasing indirect channel via smaller wage elasticity. So the wage 
effect, which is described by the first term in brackets of (35a), is ambiguous. On the 
other side there is an outside option effect, which is characterized by the second term. 
Higher profit sharing leads to higher effort and increases the labour demand. The 
outsourcing demand is decreasing, since a part of the former outsourcing will be   27
substituted by domestic effective labour, what is expressed in  0 < τ N . This leads for 
given wage to higher profits but it has to be weighted by the productivity. Since the 
employment chance is increased, this means that it would be easier to find a job in 
another industry. A better employment chance results in a higher outside option, so 
that the trade union will be more aggressive and set a higher wage. So the outside 
option effect has a positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.  
In the absence of outsourcing the expression  N  is simplified to  1 = N  with   
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, then higher profit sharing will decrease equilibrium unemployment. In 







































 it can be 
expressed in the case of flexible profit sharing and flexible outsourcing as follows 
 

















































,                                 (36a) 
 
where 
f τ has been expressed in (23). In the absence of outsourcing we have  
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f τ  has been expressed in (24).  
The analysis of changes in the unemployment rate is simplified by the assumption of 
zero effort elasticity. We know that in this case there is no profit sharing neither in the 
committed nor flexible case. This means that the wages are identical but it does not 
mean that outsourcing demand is zero. So we can analyze the effect of changes in 
outsourcing cost on equilibrium unemployment for zero effort elasticity. In this 






















γ A  and  ()
L
M
δ δ η + + = 1 ~ where the amount of outsourcing and labour 
demand are characterize as in the former analysis but with a constant effort of one and 
with an adjusted labour demand elasticity and wage. The influence of outsourcing 
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where 



































γ (see Appendix E).  This expression shows 
that only the mark-up is affected by the influence of outsourcing cost. Since the mark-
up is increasing by higher cost of external procurement, increasing outsourcing cost 
lead to higher unemployment. This is reasonable, since higher outsourcing cost 
decrease the advantage of outsourcing but results in a more comfortable position for 
the trade union. So the union can be more aggressive and set a higher wage due to   29
decreasing fear of substitution of the worker by outsourcing. The higher mark-up 
results in a decreasing labour demand which implies a negative employment effect.   
We can summarize these findings to 
 
Proposition 7  
a)  If there is profit sharing as a part of outside option in other 
industries both outsourcing cost and profit sharing will have 
ambiguous effects on equilibrium unemployment under committed 
and flexible profit sharing. In the absence of outsourcing the results 
are qualitatively similar. 
b)  If the effort elasticity is zero, higher outsourcing cost will have an 
enhancing effect on unemployment. 
 
 
7.       Conclusions 
 
We have analyzed the following questions associated with flexible outsourcing and 
with both committed and flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic labour 
markets. How does the cost of flexible outsourcing - which we assume to be substitute 
for effective domestic labour - influence both wage formation and profit sharing? 
How does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? What is the  relationship 
between outsourcing, profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment? 
We have shown that in both profit sharing scenarios lower outsourcing cost 
lowers the wage. In the presence of flexile outsourcing profit sharing is a 
supplementary or compensating part of income. If there is no outsourcing, profit 
sharing has also an ambiguous character. In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
optimal flexible profit sharing is positive but smaller than in the absence of 
outsourcing. Moreover, lower outsourcing cost and higher wage will have ambiguous 
effect on optimal flexible profit sharing, but in the absence of outsourcing higher 
wage rate will have no effect on flexible profit sharing.  
In the case of zero effort elasticity there is of course no committed or flexible 
profit sharing in the absence or presence of outsourcing. In this scenario the wages as   30
the same in the committed and flexible case, but lower in the presence outsourcing. 
Under positive effort elasticity without outsourcing higher profit sharing in the 
committed case will lead to a smaller wage compared to the flexible case under a 
complementary character of profit sharing and vice versa under a supplementary 
character of profit sharing.  
In terms of equilibrium unemployment the effects of outsourcing cost and 
profit sharing are ambiguous both in the committed and flexible profit sharing. In the 
absence of outsourcing profit sharing will also have an ambiguous unemployment 
effect. Moreover, if effort elasticity is zero, higher outsourcing cost will enhance 
unemployment.    
There are new research topics associated with these issues. Very important 
issues are to study the implications of labour taxation and labour tax reforms on 
effort, labour demand, outsourcing, wage formation, profit sharing, equilibrium 
unemployment and social welfare. The question of how labour tax reform affects 
unionized firms, which engage in outsourcing is analyzed by Koskela and Schöb 
(2008), but they abstract from effort determination and the resulting productivity 
effects. It is also important to do numerical simulations associated with various results 
we have presented. Also one important research question would be to compare the 
effects of flexible outsourcing, analyzed in this paper, with strategic outsourcing. And 
to show, which regime results in a higher degree of outsourcing. Also it is a new 
research topic to analyze the impact of product market imperfections on profit 
sharing, wage, outsourcing and unemployment. 
 
References: 
Akerlof, G.A. and J.L. Yellen (1986) (eds): Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor 
Market, Cambridge University Press, MA.  
 
Amiti, M. and S.-J. Wei (2005): Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified?, 
Economic Policy, 20, 307-347. 
 
BLACK, S.E. AND L.-M. LYNCH [2000], “What’s Driving the New Economy: The 
Benefits of Workplace Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 7479. 
 
Booth, A.J. and J. Frank (1999): Earnings, Productivity, and Performed-Related Pay, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 17(3), 447-463. 
   31
Braun, S. and J. Scheffel (2007): A Note on the Effect of Outsourcing on Union 
Wages,  SFB Discussion Paper 2007-034, Humbold Universität zu Berlin. 
 
Cable, J. and N. Wilson (1990): Profit Sharing and Productivity: Some Further 
Evidence, Economic Journal, 100, 550-555. 
 
Cahuc, P. and B. Dormont (1997): Profit Sharing: Does It Increase Productivity and 
Employment? A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence on French Micro 
Data, Labour Economics, 4, 293-319. 
 
Conyon, M. and R. Freeman (2001): Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm 
Performance: UK Evidence, NBER Working Paper No. 8448. 
 
Danthine, J.-P. and J. Hunt (1994): Wage Bargaining Structure, Employment and 
Economic Integration, Economic Journal, 104, 528-541. 
 
Hasan, R., D. Mitra and R.W. Ramaswamy (2007): Trade Reforms, Labor 
Regulations, and Labor-Demand Elasticities: Empirical Evidence from India, 
the Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3), 466-481. 
 
Koskela, E. (2008): The Effects of Labour Tax Progression under Nash-Bargaining 
and Flexible Outsourcing, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3501. 
 
Koskela, E. and J. König (2008): Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing, and 
Equilibrium Unemployment, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3413.   
 
Koskela, E. and P. Poutvaara (2008): Flexible Outsourcing and the Impacts of Labour 
Taxation Progression in European Welfare States, HECER Discussion Paper 
No. 229. 
 
Koskela, E. and R. Schöb (2008): Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impact of 
Labour Market Policy Reforms, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3566. 
 
Koskela, E. and R. Stenbacka (2006): Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with 
Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment, Journal of 
Economics, 87(2), 159-180. 
 
Koskela, E. and R. Stenbacka (2007): Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing 
under Labour Market Imperfections, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2628.    
 
Kraft, K. and M. Ugarkovic (2005): Profit-Sharing: Supplement or Substitute?, 
Dortmund University, Germany. 
 
Kruse, D.L. (1992): Profit Sharing and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence from 
the United States, Economic Journal, 102, 24-36. 
   32
Layard, R., S. Nickell and T. Jackman (2005): Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Performance and the Labor Market, 2
nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
 
Lin, C.C., J.-J. Chang and C.-C. Lai (2002): Profit Sharing as a Worker Discipline 
Device, Economic Modelling, 19(5), 815-828. 
 
Munch, J.R. and J.R. Skaksen (2005): Specialization, Outsourcing and Wages, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 1907, forthcoming in: Review of World Economics. 
 
Nickell, S. and R. Layard (1999): Labor Market Institutions and Economic 
Performance, in Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card (eds): Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 3C, North-Holland, 3029-3084.  
Pendleton, A., E. Poutsma, J. van Ommeren and C. Brester  (2001): Employee Share 
Ownership and Profit Sharing in the European Union, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Commission, Luxembourg. 
 
Perry, C.R. (1997): Outsourcing and Union Power, Journal of Labor Research, 18, 
521-534. 
 
Rishi, M. and S. C. Saxena (2004): Is Outsourcing Really as Bad as It Is Made 
Sound? A Re-assessment and Some Perspective, Working Paper, University of 
Pittsburg.  
 
Senses, M.Z. (2006): The Effects of Outsourcing on the Elasticity of Labor Demand, 
CES Discussion Paper, Washington D.C., March. 
 
Sinn, H.-W. (2007): The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization, CESifo 
Working Paper No. 1925. 
 
Slaughter, M. (2001): International Trade and Labor-Demand Elasticities, Journal of 
International Economics, 54, 27-56. 
 
Skaksen, J.R. (2004): International Outsourcing When Labor Markets Are Unionized, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 37(1), 78-94.  
 
Stefanova, B.M. (2006): The Political Economy of Outsourcing in the European 
Union and the East-European Enlargement, Business and Politics, 8, issue 2.  
 
Wadhwani, S. and M. Wall (1990): The Effects of Profit Sharing on Employment, 
Wages, Stock Returns and Productivity: Evidence from U.K. Micro Data, 
Economic Journal, 100, 1-17. 
 
Zhao, L. (20019: Unionization, Vertical Structure, and the Outsourcing of 
Multinationals, Journal of International Economics, 55, 187-202.  
   33
Appendix A:   







ηγ η η γτ η η τ γτ η
τ γτ η






1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
1
− + −








− − − + −
−
                             (A1) 




ηγ η η τ
τ γτ η
η τ τ bd dw b
w
2 2 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (













−                   (A2) 
Using  [ ]
η
τ γτ η 1 ) 1 ( − + −
=
w




ηγ η η τ
τ γτ η




1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( / ) 1 (
1 ) 1 (












−  so that we have  
()
?
) / 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( / ) 1 (
=
− − + −
− − −
=
η η τ γτ η


























                                            (A4) 
 
Appendix B:  
From the equations (19) and (20) we can look on the relationship of 
c τ  and  
c τ  by 
analyzing the inequation 
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Appendix C:  
Since equation (23) is an implicit expression we get for the derivative with respect to 
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The derivative of the ratio of outsourcing and effective labour with respect to profit 
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Appendix D:  
From a comparison of equation (19) and (23) follows that 





























































   (D1) 
This expression can be simplified to 































τ , so that we get 
0 > −
w
wτ τ ,                                        (D2) 
what is fulfilled if  0 < τ w .   36
The same holds in the absence of outsourcing but here we have 
0 > −
w
wτ τ ,                    (D3) 
what is fulfilled for  0 < τ w . 
 
Appendix E: 
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 we see that in 
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 holds. If we plug into this expression our former result for 
dc
dw
 we get 
() ( ) w c w c ⋅ + − < ⋅ ⋅ + − η η η η δ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 1   .                                       (E3) 
Using the earlier findings for  w η ~  and  c η ~  equation (E3) can be simplified to    37
( ) 1 ~ ~ 0 − < η η .                                                   (E4) 
Since this is true, we know that the third term in (E2) has a negative sign and 
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